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ETHICS AFTER GOD’S DEATH AND THE TIME 







ABSTRACT: The philosophical idea of the death of God (God understood in pre-modern terms 
as living presence) has had various semantic operations within dominant (post)modern 
positions on human empowerment. Beginning with the significance of this, the article aims to 
discuss the half-life of a God who has become a metaphor. In other words, it explores the 
reverberation of God and God's death in secularized philosophy as well as the consequences of 
this for ethics and the conception of the Good. Then, the article illustrates the complex 
connection of this aim with the Occidental delimitation of human potentialities through 
gleanings from Murdoch, Arendt and Badiou´s ideas about the constellation ‘worldlessness, 
rupture, human frailty and everydayness’. It shows that such delimitation, operative in theories 
that share most of the assumptions surrounding the above constellation, re-sacralizes the 
justification of ethics as (in)humanist programme. Finally, it indicates how this particular 
delimitation of human potentialities can be revisited through the revival of the dead metaphor 
of the angelic and the kind of ethics it can animate. 




What is it to be alive when a God is concerned? It is historically to be able to die, as 
Alain Badiou asserts,1
                                                     
1 Alain Badiou, Briefings on Existence, trans. N. Madarasz, N. York, State University of New York Press, 
2006, p. 24.  
 like all living beings whose being alive is manifest so long as 
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they are encountered by other living beings, so long as others have to live with them.2
My aim here is to discuss the half-life of a God who has become a metaphor, or, 
in other words, the reverberation of God and God's death in secularized philosophy 
as well as the consequences of this for ethics and the conception of the Good. I 
explore the complex connection of this aim with the Occidental delimitation of human 
potentialities and illustrate it through gleanings from Murdoch, Arendt and Badiou. 
Finally, I indicate how such delimitation can be revisited through the revival of the 
(philosophically) dead metaphor of the angelic and the kind of ethics it can animate.    
 
Especially when a God is concerned, being alive also means being inspiring and 
regulative of other beings' life. However, not only the living presence of God but also 
God's ideal animation of human action gives sense to life, and this is a feature Gods 
share with some metaphors. Beyond the question of living presence, ideal beings 
present metaphorically the other of human beings, the other that we are not, i.e. the 
other to be reached or the other as the outer limit of human aspiration. Some such 
idealities and metaphors enjoy a half-life, as they may no longer ‘live’ with living 
beings who used to believe in them as alive and present; but they are still creative of 
human meaning and vision at the deepest level of human motivation. Other 
metaphors, for instance that of angels, have already been dead in the sense that even 
this half-life has been denied to them, since they are no longer employed to inspire or 
guide human self-formation. Yet, they can still be revived, for the precondition for a 
revival is precisely death. 
GOD, THE GOOD AND HUMAN ACTION   
The passage from the theological to the secular worldview has been marked by 
complex philosophical responses and by efforts to making sense of it. From Hume 
down to Nietzsche, the issue is how to pass from a naturalistically debunked theology 
to a vitalistic ethics of aesthetic Dionysian creativity.3 For Nietzsche, the absenting of 
God initiates the decomposition of ‘the figure of man’;4
                                                     
2 Ibid, p. 23. 
 yet, only to open the 
possibility for the Űbermensch. God's death is expected to create a new, empowered 
humanity. Nietzsche announced quasi-messianically the advent of the ‘man of the 
future’, exploring the potentialities of the Űbermensch, of humanity's becoming God 
3 N. Turnbull, ‘Crossing Nietzsche’, Theory, Culture and Society, vol. 22, no 3, 2005, pp. 139-149, p. 148. 
4 Alain Badiou, ‘The Joint Disappearances of Man and God’, in A. Badiou, The Century, trans. A. 
Toscano, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2008, pp 165-178, p. 171. 
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after the death of God.5 In a similar shift, the sociological substitution of Humanity 
(Comte) or Society (Durkheim) for God illustrates also a way of ‘managing’ the 
secularization of meaning. For the positivist Comte, as Badiou remarks, God is 
humanity itself.6 A juxtaposition of the two tendencies, i.e., Comte´s humanist 
‘immanentization of the True’7 and Nietzsche´s overcoming of humanism through the 
death of divinity clearly demarcates the productive effects of the transcendent void. 
‘Comte's positive faith in Humanity […] is suspended over the abyss which Nietzsche 
inscribed with “the death of God”, to whose vertiginous and culturally dissolvent 
consequences it can be interpreted as both a panic reaction and an alternative 
response’.8
Similar stances stem from another lineage of thought, the one initiated by Hegel. 
For Badiou,
 On balance, the adaptive response of theory to secularization has been to 
couch in a secular idiom what was once theologically thought as realization, 
fulfillment and plenitude.  
9 Hegel thought of God as ‘the process of a supposedly complete man’. As 
for Kojève, known for his important elaboration on Hegelian philosophy of 
intersubjectivity, God's death opened a path for a re-formulated humanity. With the 
Enlightenment, Christianity ceased to be ‘a dogmatic theology but became a social 
and cultural possibility: a state of affairs where the Christian ideal of a masterless 
world of mutual respect became a founding idea and a real historical force’. From 
Kojève´s Hegelian perspective, the Enlightenment only negated Christian theology, 
not its anthropological ideal. Thus, in Kojève's view, ‘Christian man can only become 
what he would like to be by becoming a man without God - or if you will a God-man. 
He must realize in himself what at first he thought was realized in his God’.10 Marx's 
well-known view that religion is the opium of people and it will become expendable 
when humanity reaches emancipation11
                                                     
5 A. Wernick, ‘From Comte to Baudrillard: Socio-Theology After the End of the Social’, Theory, Culture 
and Society, vol. 17, no 6, 2000, pp. 55-75, p. 56. 
 operates within the same framework of 
substitution. In Marx's own words, as quoted by Kordela, ‘to call on people to give up 
their illusions about their condition is to call on them to give up a condition that requires 
illusions. The criticism of religion is therefore in embryo the criticism of that vale of tears of 
6 Badiou, ‘The Joint Disappearances of Man and God’, p. 168. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Wernick, ‘From Comte to Baudrillard’, p. 56. 
9 Badiou, ‘The Joint Disappearances of Man and God’, p. 167. 
10 Cf Turnbull, ‘Crossing Nietzsche’, p. 146.  
11 A. K. Kordela, (1999). ‘Political Metaphysics: God in Global Capitalism (the Slave, the Masters, Lacan, 
and the Surplus)’ Political Theory, vol. 27, no 6, 1999, pp. 789-839, p. 818.  
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which religion is the halo’.12 Through this prism, Slavoi Zizek's idea that ‘Christianity 
both presupposes a materialist philosophy and is at the same time a 
phenomenological precondition for authentic Marxist consciousness’13
  Long before those developments, the Kantian praise
 makes better 
sense.    
14 of revolutionary enthusiasm 
and of the optimist philosophy of human history it could inspire had pointed to the 
self-reforming and world changing potentiality of emancipated rational human action. 
The connotations here cannot be missed; we need only to recall the Greek etymology 
of the noun ‘enthusiasm’. It is derived from the verbs ‘entheazo’ and ‘enthousiazo’, 
both composed by the words ‘en’ and ‘theos’ (God) and combined in the root 
‘enthous’, which means to ‘be possessed by God’, ‘to have God in me’, to ‘be ecstatic’, 
οr, in a more transitive sense, to ‘cause enthusiasm’, to ‘inspire’, to ‘inculcate, breathe, 
God in the other’. Such connotations give us an aesthetic or symbolic representation 
of the truth in Wernick's assertion that the highest aim of political conduct within the 
modern framework was theogenic, i.e. making God. 15
The examples of Nietzsche's superhumanity of humanity, Comte's socio-theology, 
Kojève's anthropology as well as the example of revolutionary enthusiasm are 
emblematic of a tendency that was shaped in modernity and was meant to determine, 
almost unconsciously, as I shall show, the fate of philosophy in postmodernity too. 
What is at stake in the postmodern era is the position of radical redirection of human 
beings within a secular scheme that rules out the hope of divine assistance or 
providential planning. Now that no theodicy is allowed to harness the evil manifested 
in the smooth course of quotidian human life and place it at the service of a 
providential heterogeneity of ends (Ferguson), of a ‘cunning of nature’ (Kant) or of a 
‘cunning of reason’ (Hegel),
   
16
                                                     
12 Ibid. 
    what makes an ethico-political radical redirection 
possible? What is presupposed is a certain reworking of humanity's relation to the 
Good. Following in the steps of some post-Enlightenment philosophy, contemporary 
thinking is still struggling to understand the death of God not as a symbol of 
meaninglessness and despair but as an ‘evental’ openness of a new human possibility. 
This struggle is marked by an encounter with a meaning-producing nothingness, one 
13 Turnbull, ‘Crossing Nietzsche’, p. 143.  
14 For a discussion of it, see, J.-F. Lyotard, The Differend: phrases in dispute, trans. G. Van Den Abbeele, 
Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1988, pp. 161ff. For a discussion of Lyotard's position, see, M. 
Papastephanou, ‘Linguistic Archipelago and (its) History’, Metaphilosophy, vol. 33, no 5, 2002, pp. 566-586. 
15 Wernick, ‘From Comte to Baudrillard’, p. 63. 
16 On these notions, see, for instance, M. Papastephanou, ‘Kant’s Cosmopolitanism and Human History’, 
History of the Human Sciences, vol. 15, no. 1, 2002, pp. 17-38.  
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that is taken to generate perhaps the only human truth, the one of self-making and of 
truth's human-made nature.  
For liberalism, secularization is the opening of new possibilities for an achievable 
modest betterment, for personal well-being via tolerance and respect of rights and for 
consensual deliberative handling of public issues. For much German contemporary 
philosophy along Habermasian lines, the issue of God (along with the question of why 
act morally) is bracketed and left to existential individual choice. In this vein, the 
emphasis is put on the possibility of a redemptive continuity, a reengagement with the 
counterfactual possibilities that remained unexploited by the Enlightenment. For 
much French philosophy, an ethic of break and disruption of everydayness is 
championed that, despite its secular gloss,17
 Yet, the loss of revolutionary enthusiasm, the kind of enthusiasm that used to be 
associated with political projects of radical change
 it echoes all the resonance of religious 
parlance in the way the evental, the epiphany, the ineffable and unpresentable are set 
against quotidian normalcy.  
18 - the absence of which Habermas 
describes as typical of the postmodern era,19 is loss of divine inspiration. After 
Auschwitz, revolutionary self-confidence and enthusiasm turn into despair, while the 
inability to conjure up theodicy to mitigate the senselessness of recurrent evil and 
vindicate an optimist account of the quotidian has led to a wholesale indictment of 
daily life. The space is opened for the liberal anti-utopianism of piecemeal 
engineering of societal change and for the modest goals that are appropriate to an 
essentially incriminated human being, which I see as some of the varying effects of 
developments which could be placed under Badiou´s conception of ‘animal 
humanism’.20
                                                     
17 For Rudolf Bernet, ‘a theological turn in the French phenomenology of the last fifty years’ has been 
noted. R. Bernet, ‘Christianity and Philosophy’, Continental Philosophy Review, vol. 32, 1999, pp. 325-342, p. 
325. His examples include the names of P. Ricoeur, E. Levinas, M. Henry and J. Derrida.   
 Sure, this occurred through complex and often contradictory moves 
that cannot be chronicled here, but the upshot is that, ironically, a contemptus mundi, so 
reminiscent of some medieval philosophy, goes hand in hand with the secular loss of 
faith in any utopian qualities of the mundane – one that affects, as I argue later, even 
Badiou´s own project. We could adapt here Wernick's aphorism (although it was 
18 Lyotard, The Differend: phrases in dispute, pp. 151ff.  
19 J. Habermas, ‘A reply to my Critics’ in J. Thompson and D. Held, (eds.), Habermas: Critical Debates, 
Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1982, pp. 219-283. 
20 Badiou, ‘The Joint Disappearances of Man and God’, p. 175. 
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written for a different context) that ‘if the old god has culturally expired, the new one 
is not only mortal, and under threat. It is dead on arrival’.21
THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF GOODNESS, ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR TRUTH 
AND THE ACCOMMODATION OF INESCAPABLE HUMAN FAILURE  
   
In her novel The Time of the Angels, Iris Murdoch describes the passage from the 
theological to the secular self-understanding of humanity, as well as the concomitant 
psychological and ethical trauma, as follows.  
The concept [of Good] is empty. This has been said of the concept of God. It is 
even more true of the concept of Good. It would be a consolation, it would be a 
beatitude, to think that with the death of God the era of the true spirit begins, 
while all that went before was a fake. But this too would be a lie […]. With or 
without the illusion of God, goodness is impossible to us. We have been made 
too low in the order of things. God made it impossible that there should be true 
saints.22
It seems to me that this extract illustrates some of the most celebrated ideas of 
postmodern philosophy, of some of its precursors, of its contemporary advocates or 
even of some of its critics. For Kant, in Badiou´s parlance, ‘the Good, and not the 
True, opens man to God’;
   
23
 The context of this surrender is marked, I claim, by both religious and 
Hobbesian residues. Goodness is understood in an absolute Christian sense of 
unworldliness and unconditionality. In Arendt's words, chiming with those of 
Murdoch in implying the impossibility of ethical ideality, ‘goodness can exist only 
when it is not perceived, not even by its author; whoever sees himself performing a 
good work is no longer good, but at best a useful member of society or a dutiful 
member of a church’. Goodness as absolute inwardness is further presented as 
 we saw in the introduction that this link has been broken. 
Yet, the concept of God is reconnected, after the modernist interval, with the concept 
of the Good, but only in their common feature of emptiness, as we see in the above 
passage. The anthropological enthusiasm of the possibility for human perfectibility 
through emancipated action is now considered a delusion. Ironically, the era that 
dislikes the word ‘impossible’ about almost all issues of technological, biological and 
pragmatic change is at the same time the era that takes the impossibility of radical 
ethical redirection for granted.  
                                                     
21 Wernick, ‘From Comte to Baudrillard’, p. 66. 
22 I. Murdoch, The Time of the Angels, introduction by R. Holloway, London, Vintage, 2002 [1966], pp. 171-
2.  
23 Badiou, ‘The Joint Disappearances of Man and God’, p. 167. 
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unconditionally self-referential. ‘For it is manifest that the moment a good work 
becomes known and public, it loses its specific character of goodness, of being done 
for nothing but goodness' sake’.24 This dehumanized goodness of isolation meets, 
then, the additional insuperable barrier of a quotidian world of conflict, antagonism 
and egoism. In the Human Condition, Arendt adumbrates that any effort toward the 
good is doomed to fail, since ‘no man can be good, save God’;25 interestingly, her 
textual support there comes from Luke and other religious sources. In like fashion, 
Murdoch's novel assures that ‘one must be good for nothing, without sense or reward, 
in the world of Jehovah and Leviathan, and that is why goodness is impossible for us 
human beings. It is not only impossible, it is not even imaginable, we cannot really 
name it, in our realm it is non-existent’.26
  What is thus precluded is goodness becoming concretized through public good 
works, but this condemns the concept of goodness to remain disconnected from 
action. In fear of moralizing the public sphere, Arendt's approach ends up in the 
opposite direction, i.e., to construct a public in more proximity to a Machiavellian 
world
  
27 rather than to the ancient Greek world of public distinction and excellence 
that is her initial preference.28  Goodness, ‘as a consistent way of life, is not only 
impossible within the confines of the public realm, it is even destructive of it. Nobody 
perhaps has been more sharply aware of this ruinous quality of doing good than 
Machiavelli, who, in a famous passage, dared to teach men “how not to be good”’.29 
This is because ‘goodness must go into absolute hiding and flee all appearance if it is 
not to be destroyed’.30 For, to Arendt, a ‘goodness that comes out of hiding and 
assumes a public role is no longer good, but corrupt in its own terms and will carry its 
own corruption wherever it goes’.31
                                                     
24 H. Arendt, The Human Condition, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1989, p. 74. My attention 
was drawn to these passages by Vikki Bell's text, ‘On the Critique of Secular Ethics: an essay with 
Flannery O' Connor and Hannah Arendt’ in Theory, Culture and Society vol. 22, no 2, 2005, pp. 1-27. 
 Like Murdoch in The Time of the Angels, Arendt 
25 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 75. 
26 Murdoch, The Time of the Angels, p. 172. 
27 Arendt, The Human Condition, pp. 75-7. To avoid a misunderstanding of Arendt's theory, it has to be said 
that this world is Machiavellian only in the sense of grounding politics beyond good and evil. 
28 The story of Herostratus who notoriously burnt Efesus for posterity and was condemned rather than 
praised shows us precisely that distinction was not secured in antiquity just through unprecedented, 
innovative moves, but through moves that were considered great because of their goodness. 
29 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 77. This is no accidental approval: see the rest of her comments on 
Machiavelli in the same page. 
30 Ibid, p. 75. 
31 Ibid, p. 77. 
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reaches such conclusions because she draws her conception of goodness from religious 
absolutism and lacks any alternative to counterweight the latter's moralism.  
Further proof of this is found in the following passage where the Christian 
undertone meets an unspoken Hobbesian treatment of humanity as inherently 
incapable of radical goodness. ‘Good works, because they must be forgotten instantly, 
can never become part of this world; they come and go, leaving no trace. They truly 
are not of this world. It is this worldlessness inherent in good works that makes the 
lover of goodness an essentially religious figure and that makes goodness […] an 
essentially non-human, superhuman quality’.32 The word ‘essentially’ is crucial in its 
semantic proximity to essentialism: the assertions that the lover of goodness is 
essentially a religious figure and that goodness has an essentially non-human quality 
mirror nothing other than the essentialist conjunction of religious and Hobbesian 
human understanding.33 For, the Hobbesian thesis is ‘that naked self-interest is the 
sole motivating force in human affairs, and that state authority is merely the outcome 
of a contract entered into for the sake of limiting its more destructive effects’.34 In 
Murdoch's parlance, ‘I assume that human beings are naturally selfish and that 
human life has no external point’.35 Significantly, when F. B. A. Asiedu comments on 
this passage from a religious point of view, the first statement, i.e. about natural 
selfishness, is endorsed [‘the first of her premises might receive little objection’36
 The inevitable theoretical implication of Arendt's view that ‘no man can be good 
save God’
] and 
only the second is challenged on grounds of meaningfulness of human life. This shows 
once again the convergence of versions of Christian onto-anthropology with the 
Hobbesian liberal counterpart.   
37
                                                     
32 Ibid, p. 76. 
 can be better unpacked through Murdoch's ideas. What is implied there is 
a radical questioning of the possibility of ethics – at least in its idealized sense that 
goes beyond social coordination of action: for ‘God was at least the name of 
33 For a humanity that is coming out of a world war and still engaged in the imperialist politics of 
colonialism or about to deploy cold war diplomacy and strategies, this essentialism is very comforting. It 
shifts the burden of political responsibility from the West and places it on humanity as a whole. Any 
human being would act in the way the Western subject does, since we are only human after all. 
34 C. Norris, Spinoza and the Origins of Modern Critical Theory, Oxford, Blackwell, 1991, p. 157. Norris makes 
this point with regard to Foucault's rhetoric of power/knowledge, but his discussion could very well apply 
to the whole philosophical trend that I examine here. 
35 I. Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970, p. 78. 
36 F. B. A. Asiedu, ‘Intimations of the Good: Iris Murdoch, Richard Swinburne and the promise of 
Theism’, HeyJ XLII, 2001, pp. 26-49, p. 32. 
37 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 75. 
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something which we thought was good’;38 now that the old enabling fiction no longer 
holds, ethics is groundless, unpresentable and ineffable. It has to be clarified here,39 
however, that Murdoch does not deny all moral theorizing; this would be a 
misrepresentation of her approach. While stating that the ‘good’ is empty and ethics is 
in need of transfiguration, Murdoch maintains both her interest and her faith in the 
practical weight of an ethics that operates with what she calls ‘secondary moral words’ 
rather than with primary and general ones such as ‘the good’.40 As she writes, 
‘modern ethics analyzes “good”, the empty action word which is the correlate of the 
isolated will, and tends to ignore other value terms’.41 The latter ground thoughtful 
moral life and comprise courage, complacency, sincerity, helpfulness, 
presumptuousness42
  Be that as it may, as we have already seen, for Arendt too, ‘goodness in its purity 
does not belong - indeed, cannot exist - within the public realm’.
 and other such notions that we employ as social beings for 
assessing moral conduct.    
43 A dipole is being 
consolidated: an absolute ethics of transcendence, on the one hand, and an 
incriminated ontology of humanity that raises insurmountable obstacles to goodness, 
on the other. Even when ethics is not thereby dismissed but, on the contrary, 
prioritized precisely on such grounds,44 ontology as the polar other of ethics becomes 
indicted in essentialist fashion.45 Hence, for Levinas whose face-to-face ethics is the best 
example of such prioritization, ‘the Good, and consequently ethics, situate themselves 
beyond essence’.46
  Yet, more often than not, the drastic choice between such ethics and such 
ontology does not operate in favor of a rejuvenation of ethical or moral discourse and 
its validity claims. To many contemporary thinkers and their commentators, the 
advent of a secular era demarcates, along with the death of dogmatic theology, a 
   
                                                     
38 Murdoch, The Time of the Angels, p. 171. 
39 I am indebted to the anonymous reviewer of Cosmos and History for this valuable clarification and for 
drawing my attention to the necessity of avoiding a lopsided presentation of Murdoch. 
40 Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, p. 22. 
41 Ibid, p. 8. 
42 For these examples, thanks are due, again, to the anonymous reviewer of C & H. 
43 Bell, ‘On the Critique of Secular Ethics’, p. 15. 
44 E. Levinas, ‘To Think God on the Basis of Ethics’, in Levinas, God, Death, and Time, trans. B. Bergo, 
Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2000, pp. 136-139, p. 137. 
45 M. Papastephanou, ‘Onto-theology and the Incrimination of Ontology in Levinas and Derrida’, 
Philosophy and Social Criticism, vol. 31, no 4, 2005, pp. 461-485.  
46 Bernet, ‘Christianity and Philosophy’, p. 326. 
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demolition of moral autonomy, justice and truth. Murdoch describes this tendency as 
follows: ‘We cannot know the truth because […] it is something that cannot be 
endured. People will endlessly conceal from themselves that good is only good if one is 
good for nothing. The whole history of philosophy, the whole of theology, is this act of 
concealment’.47 Even the only truth that this Zeitgeist considers unshakable, the one of 
human inescapable guilt is, according to Murdoch, concealed. As to other truths, 
relativism becomes the only paradigmatic certainty, since ‘there is nothing any more 
to prevent the magnetism of many spirits’.48 Once the Shibboleths of modernity are 
deconstructed, unmasked as residues of an onto-theology that arrests time, there is no 
point or no room left for reconstructive approximations of truth. Approximations of 
that sort are not only doomed from the start as they, supposedly, pursue a chimera, 
but they are also presented as dangerous in perpetuating the illusion that such effort is 
the raison d´ être of philosophy. Anticipating Foucault,49 the above extracts claim that 
the abolition of power systems could leave nothing at all, nothing visibly human. Or 
new codes and disciplines will be produced but we shall have no reason to expect ‘that 
these will be any better than the ones we now live with’, or we may not even know 
what ‘better’ might mean.50
Truth is unknown and therefore relative. However, this uncoupling of philosophy 
as truth-seeking and thought as the space opened by the end of the author does not 
always entail the abandonment of the kind of humanity-as-programme that had 
inspired radical humanism. Despite the gap separating, say, Sartre from Foucault, 
‘radical humanism and radical anti-humanism agree on the theme of Godless man as 
opening, possibility, programme of thought’.
  
51
                                                     
47 Murdoch, The Time of the Angels, pp. 171-2 
 In an interesting sequence, and from 
another perspective, for many who share a large part of the ontological assumptions 
about humanity's predatory employment or treatment of ‘knowledge’ but wish to 
avoid the relativist conclusion at all costs and to maintain the post-God programme, 
‘truth is unknown’ does not merely describe a disjunction of two terms, i.e. truth and 
knowledge. It describes rather a contradiction in terms. There is ‘no knowledge of 
48 Ibid, p. 171. 
49 Just as above, my reference to Foucault here is not accidental, for he also belongs in this lineage and 
his ideas could be paralleled to those of Arendt and Murdoch that have attracted my attention here.  
50 C. Norris, The Truth About Postmodernism, Oxford, Blackwell, 1993, p. 51. Norris's discussion of Foucault 
on this point draws from Walzer's critique of determinism and nihilism. 
51 Badiou, ‘The Joint Disappearances of Man and God’, p. 171. 
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truth’, for ‘truth makes a hole in knowledge’.52
I turn to Badiou at this juncture because his thought is emblematic of the 
possibility to share some of the above assumptions of Arendt and Murdoch – despite 
the very many differences on surrounding philosophical issues - but to be unwilling to 
subscribe to some of their conclusions and thereby to produce an interesting, 
innovative and valuable (yet, in my view, not always felicitous) account of ethics and 
truth. Badiou shares with Arendt and Murdoch the conviction about a predatory, 
aggressive and egoistic side of humanity
 Truth is unknown not because it 
escapes the order of knowledge but because it shatters it: for Lacan, and Badiou who 
follows him on this, truth is a hole on the body of knowledge because knowledge 
connotes automation, transmission and repetition, whereas truth is interruption, 
break and risky decision.  
53 in a Hobbesian sense. As we shall see below, 
Terry Eagleton´s criticism that Badiou's ‘philosophy reads rather like a bizarre 
conjuncture of Hobbes and St Paul’54
More specifically, knowledge is to Badiou,
 can better be justified through placing the 
relevant points of his works alongside those of Murdoch and Arendt.   
55 just as to Arendt,56
In the Sovereignty of Good, Murdoch writes that ‘good is mysterious because of 
human frailty, because of the immense distance which is involved. If there were angels 
 a manifestation of 
human automation and statistical repetition that solidifies hierarchies and perpetuates 
the status quo. He wishes to rescue truth from all this habitualization by grounding 
truth in the eruptive and subversive event, just as Arendt grounds it in natality and 
Murdoch in the ‘unselfing’ force of beauty. Apparently unlike them, Badiou 
dissociates ethics from the unworldly and the ineffable and aspires to elaborate an 
ethic of political intervention and change. Still, as I shall show, his theoretical universe 
is parallel in its shortcomings to those of Arendt and Murdoch. It will become 
apparent if we follow the thread from the assumption of the impossibility of goodness 
down to the assumption of human failure and selfishness and view how the latter 
completes the picture of an onto-anthropology affected by the Christian and 
Hobbesian essentialist residue.          
                                                     
52 A. Badiou, Manifesto for Philosophy, trans. Norman Madarasz, New York, State University of New 
York Press, 1999, p. 80.   
53 See, A. Badiou, Ethics: an essay on the understanding of evil, trans. P. Hallward, London, Verso, 2001 and A. 
Badiou, Saint-Paul: The Foundation of Universalism, trans. R. Brassier, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 
2003. 
54 T. Eagleton, ‘Subjects and Truths’ New Left Review vol. 9, 2001, pp. 155-160, p. 159. 
55 Badiou, Manifesto for Philosophy, p. 37 and Badiou, Saint-Paul: The Foundation of Universalism, p. 
45. 
56 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 178. 
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they might be able to define good but we would not understand the definition’.57 This negative side 
of the self that creates an unfathomable gap between goodness and frailty needs to be 
monitored and contained, and so political rule becomes the bridle of a rampant 
human nature. Regarding a similar assumption, Arendt quotes in a footnote the 
following idea of Madison: ‘but what is government itself but the greatest of all 
reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If 
angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls would be 
necessary’.58
 Just as in the cited extract from Murdoch and in Arendt's reference to Madison, 
in much postmodernist discursive hegemony too, and in the thought of many of its 
critics, the only paradigmatic certainty, the most unshakable truth, appears to be that 
of inescapable human failure, of human essential incompatibility with unconditional 
goodness. Human nature precludes the prospects for radical moral and social change 
beyond mere adjustment to, and refinement of, the state and the law. The model is an 
absolute saintliness beyond ontology and its economies, which, in its unattainable 
height, it effects a despondency that blocks the possibility for a radical and redemptive 
politics. This model is further supported by the only signs of vitality that the metaphor 
of the angel enjoys in much philosophizing. As we saw in the above quotations from 
Murdoch and Arendt, the angelic is recruited to illustrate absolute impossibility, 
radical difference and ineluctable absence.   
  
 Summing up Arendt's disconnection of ethics and politics around the axis of 
unconditionality, aneconomy and worldlessness, we may establish the affinity with the 
postmodern celebration of the human desire to escape all order of knowledge and the 
failure to do so - what I would call the ‘impossibility yet necessity’ thesis (a phrase 
drawn from the deconstructive context). In Bell's succinct way, to Arendt, ‘institutions 
cannot be founded on goodness; they cannot respond to things outside the world, 
“whether angels or devils”’.59 For ‘“good works” have a “worldlessness” that 
differentiates them from action; goodness lacks the capacity to appear in the world’.60
                                                     
57 Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, p. 40, emphasis added. 
 
Goodness belongs to the other of humanity and its worldliness: it is the divine other of 
institutions and human historical learning process. Likewise, for the later Derrida, 
ethics ‘is a matter of absolute decisions, which must be made outside all given norms 
and forms of knowledge; decisions which are utterly vital, yet which completely evade 
58 In Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 110, fn. 54, emph added. 
59 Bell, ‘On the Critique of Secular Ethics’, p. 16. Also, H. Arendt, On Revolution, London, Penguin, 1990, 
p. 84.  
60 Bell, ‘On the Critique of Secular Ethics’, p. 15. 
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conceptualization’. 61 Yearning and failure demarcate the inexorable circle of 
repetition into which humanity is trapped, equally determined by it and responsible 
for it. ‘Such ethical choices are at once necessary and “impossible”, wholly mine yet 
“the decision of the other in me”, a kind of implacable destiny for which, like 
Oedipus, we are nevertheless entirely to blame’.62 The ‘impossibility yet necessity’ 
thesis is accomplished through a spectral presence of God. For Arendt, ‘God [is] the 
only imaginable witness of good works’.63 For Derrida, ‘confronted in our solitude 
with such asocial, incommunicable crises of judgement, “we fear and tremble before 
the inaccessible secret of a God who decides for us although we remain 
responsible”’.64
  At first sight, Badiou seems to oppose this ‘impossibility yet necessity’ thesis as he 
is at odds with Derrida's position and its Levinassian undertones (as well as the 
postmodern utilization of them). Peter Hallward makes this point most eloquently in 
his introduction to Badiou's Ethics: an essay on the understanding of evil.
  
65 Thus, in Badiou's 
philosophy gone is the Derridean ‘theoretical association of ethics with a “goodness 
too good for this world”, along with its practical (legal) justification of this same 
world’.66 Yet, the possible implications of such a distance are almost annihilated 
(regarding the point of concern here) when we consider that for Badiou just as for 
Derrida67 the realm of decision is distinguished from that of knowledge. Badiou shares 
with his opponents the view of the good being excessive and beyond the supposed 
automatism of everydayness.68
                                                     
61 Eagleton, ‘Subjects and Truths’, p. 156. I follow Eagleton's parlance solely for reasons of space, 
succinctness and relevance, in no way aiming to replace a direct discussion of the original Derridean 
sources with secondary bibliography. For my own direct engagement with Derridean texts on these 
issues, see, Papastephanou, ‘Onto-theology and the Incrimination of Ontology’.  
 Astonishingly reminiscent of Arendt's legality, the law 
62 Eagleton, ‘Subjects and Truths’, p. 156. 
63 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 76. 
64 Cf. Eagleton, ‘Subjects and Truths’, p. 156. 
65 In Badiou, Ethics: an essay on the understanding of evil, pp. xxii-xxvii. 
66 Ibid, p. xxxvi. 
67 Ibid, p. xxv. 
68 By everydayness, the everyday, the quotidian etc, I do not refer strictly to how daily life is in our 
contemporary world. I refer, rather, to the everyday as the complex, invaluably rich modes of actual 
existence, irrespective of time and space. This sense of everydayness encompassing liberating forces and 
suppressed potentialities that contradict habitualizing tendencies characterizes even the worst 
accomplished dystopia. Thus the way I employ the term is close to Agnes Heller´s use. To her, as 
Gardiner explains, ‘daily life cannot be understood as a “thing” or “system”, or even an “attitude”. 
Instead, she conceptualizes the everyday as an ensemble of historically constituted practices and forms of 
subjectivity that are complexly related to and mediated by other structures, institutions and practices’. 
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in Badiou ‘governs a predicative, worldly multiplicity, granting to its part of the whole 
its due’. In contrast to law, ‘evental grace governs a multiplicity in excess of itself, one 
that is indescribable, superabundant relative to itself as well as with respect to the 
fixed distribution of the law’.69 Where he differs from the ‘impossibility yet necessity’ 
thesis is in his consideration of redemptive politics as possible, in breaking with the 
conclusion of its impossibility yet without jettisoning its theoretical underpinnings. He 
wishes to see ‘the way towards the positive prescription of possibilities, the way 
towards the Good as the superhumanity of humanity, towards the Immortal as the master 
of time’ unblocked.70 The good is excessive and beyond the order of knowledge; it is 
beyond everydayness. A quotidian realm saturated with the predatory, egoistic 
automatism of a mortal biological being can be transcended by a good without God,71 
an ethical decision that restitutes ‘the infinite to the banality of manifold-being’72 and 
redeems the Immortality of the human self, rendering it a subject. Yet, the 
impossibility, the revenge of quotidian automation, lurks ontologically and not merely 
socially, as it would do in other variations of post-Marxism.73 Hence, for Badiou, just 
as for most strands of contemporary thought since Kant´s idea74
    Consider first how this subjective split is manifest in Murdoch's text.  
 of the ‘unsocial 
sociability of men’, the subject is split.        
We are largely mechanical creatures, the slaves of relentless strong selfish forces 
the nature of which we scarcely comprehend. At best, as decent persons, we are 
usually very specialized. We behave well in areas where this can be done fairly 
easily and let other areas of possible virtue remain undeveloped. There are 
perhaps in the case of every human being insuperable psychological barriers to 
goodness. The self is a divided thing and the whole of it cannot be redeemed any 
more than it can be known.75
                                                                                                                                           
Thus, the everyday is ‘a universal human experience’ and as such it exists ‘in all societies, although of 
course the actual content of the mundane life-world and its relationship to wider sociohistorical forces is 
historically variable. […] Heller asserts that in pursuing the goal of “humanizing” and democratizing 
everyday life we must strive to nurture utopian hopes within a largely (but not inevitably) dystopian 
society that exists in the present day’. M. E. Gardiner, ‘Marxism and the Convergence of Utopia and the 
Everyday’ History of the Human Sciences vol. 19, no 3, 2006, pp. 1-32, pp. 24-5.     
  
69 Badiou, Saint-Paul: The Foundation of Universalism, p. 78. 
70 Badiou, Ethics: an essay on the understanding of evil, pp. 31-2, emphasis added. 
71 Badiou, Briefings on Existence.  
72 Ibid, p. 30. 
73 For such variations, see, Gardiner, ‘Marxism and the Convergence of Utopia and the Everyday’. 
74 I. Kant, in H. Reiss, ed., Kant: Political Writings, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 44. 
75 Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, p. 40, emphasis added. 
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The self is similarly divided in Badiou. ‘In reality, one subject is the weaving 
together of two subjective paths, which Paul names the flesh (sarx) and the spirit 
(pneuma)’.76 Even if one grants the empirical validity and currency of this split, which is 
a debatable theoretical move in itself, one should question the onto-anthropological 
status it gains through philosophical hegemonic concordance from modernity 
onwards. That this split acquires an onto-anthropological relevance that works 
ultimately as an ethical alibi and domesticates, ontologically, human failures that 
could be otherwise interpreted as merely ideological is shown by Badiou's own 
employment of the subjective division in the case of Saint Paul. Note the essentialist 
tone and its indirectly exculpating function in the following description of Saint Paul. 
‘Because he is a violent, grudge-bearing man (for how could the path of death not persist 
in dividing the subject?), there are occasions in which he lets it be understood that 
evildoers […] will not be particularly well treated’.77
I have argued that a variety of positions on ethics (from redemptive politics and its 
hostility to relativism down to the ‘impossibility yet necessity’ thesis and further on to 
the view that a morality for nothing, a non-contractual relation, is impossible and that 
moral relativism is the logical conclusion of the end of philosophy) could be due to an 
implicit endorsement of a Hobbesian anthropology. Before I clarify how the 
connection between ethics and humanity (as the other of the divine) is complemented 
with a wholesale incrimination of everydayness, I shall tackle a possible objection to 
the Hobbesian affinity I detected in the texts above. The objection is that some of 
these thinkers, e.g. Arendt, or their followers, would explicitly reject Hobbes or 
protest at the assumption of direct influence. To show how it is possible on these 
issues to reject Hobbes but reintroduce him by the back door, I make a detour here to 
discuss the example of Spinoza.  
  
The reason why I employ this example is that Spinoza placed his ideas squarely 
against Hobbes (on the points that concern us here) but unwittingly reintroduced his 
ideological commitment to an incriminated anthropology in a manner that is 
reminiscent of many contemporary theorists. For, even when there is no issue of 
direct influence, or even contemporary accounts that are at first sight dismissive of it, 
the Hobbesian thesis ‘that naked self-interest is the sole motivating force in human 
affairs’ seems to have somehow imbued much of current thought. To produce a 
similar effect, even a more mitigated form of this thesis would suffice, one that 
reformulates it as follows: ‘even if naked self-interest is not the sole force in human 
affairs, it is nevertheless an important and inescapable parameter of human affairs’. 
                                                     
76 Badiou, Saint-Paul: The Foundation of Universalism, p. 55. 
77 Ibid., p.94, emphasis added. 
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The unqualified welcome of this thesis, owed to the exaggeration of empiricist 
conclusions about history, leads, by implication, to the impossibility of true goodness. 
Like most contemporary theorists, Spinoza also accepts some of Hobbes's empirical 
pragmatics for the sake of a realist account of politics. However, at first sight, he 
seems to break with the Hobbesian account of human nature and the natural 
condition. For the Hobbesian state of nature ‘is a chaos of conflicting wills, interests 
and desires, a perpetual warfare of all against all which can only be restrained by the 
sovereign imposition of state authority and power’. By contrast, Spinoza's ‘“natural 
condition” is a life conducted in free-willed accordance with the dictates of reason, or 
in pursuit of common goods - like justice, liberty and truth’.78
Consider Spinoza's words. ‘If human nature were such that men desired nothing 
but what true reason prescribes, a society would need no laws whatsoever’:
 Yet, as I show below 
there is only a difference in degree. Neither Spinoza nor Arendt and Badiou would 
accept that naked self-interest is the sole motivation of humanity. But they would still 
grant self-interest a large motivational role; thereby, they would not avoid a static 
conception of what counts (and how it comes to count) as self-interest. 
79 yet, we 
should wonder here whether there is such a thing as a fixed human nature that 
delimits what people desire prior to their acculturation. What kind of philosophical 
research is most appropriate to the question of human nature? In my opinion, before 
any attempt to reconstruct this notion, we need first to deconstruct the received view 
down to its ultimate conclusions. Going only halfway leads to uneasy concessions to 
the kind of postmodern political pessimism that sees the passage from ethics to politics 
as always forced and inexorably externally imposed and that imposes a drastic choice 
between ethics and politics. This can be immediately extrapolated even from 
Spinoza's theory. Because human nature does not allow people to wish only what true 
reason prescribes, ‘no society can exist without government and force, and hence 
without laws to control and restrain the unruly appetites of men’.80
                                                     
78 Norris, Spinoza and the Origins of Modern Critical Theory, p. 158. 
 In some proximity to 
the (post)modern failure to radically question Hobbesian essentialism, Spinoza seems 
also to arrest time by unwittingly elevating history- and context-dependent ideas (sub 
specie durationis contents of thought), e.g. the unruly appetites of men, to the status of 
unshakable truths (sub specie aeternitatis tenets). He views some contents of thought 
(which, due to their intuitive self-evidence, they enjoyed, then as now, hegemonic 
concordance) from a quasi-divine perspective of pure, disinterested knowledge and 
79 Cf Norris, Spinoza and the Origins of Modern Critical Theory, p. 157. 
80 Spinoza quoted in Norris, Spinoza and the Origins of Modern Critical Theory, p. 157, emphasis mine. 
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not as revisable conjectures under dominant interpretations of socio-political 
conditions.   
What is thus effected, both in Spinoza and in more recent cases, is an 
immurement in ideological onto-anthropological thought. The notion of ideology can 
be understood here as equivalent to Spinoza's ‘knowledge of imagination’, i.e. ‘the 
kind of “natural” or pre-reflective attitude that accepts what is given in a 
commonsense way, and finds no reason to question or to criticize the grounds of naïve 
sense-certainty’.81 Following the path of this conception of ideology, we may reach an 
immanent critique of the Spinozist talk about the ‘unruly appetites of men’ (that are 
ostensibly endemic to human nature) and we may identify it as ideological, since it is 
unquestioned and taken for granted once and for all on grounds of the naïve sense-
certainty that the empirical encounter of unruly appetites produces. The 
ontologization of the kind of anthropology82
                                                     
81 Norris, Spinoza and the Origins of Modern Critical Theory, p. 35. 
 that derives from the intuitive, an 
intuitive that is constructed point by point through the hitherto inauspicious record of 
humanity, is sheer ideology. For, instead of questioning the time-honored reliance on 
how human affairs have so far been and instead of exploring the counter-intuitive, 
political thought consolidates the amassed empirical evidence as an ahistorical 
anthropological constant that determines futurity (e.g. if there have always been wars, 
then wars will be breaking out forever). The need to avoid utopian reverie and to 
acknowledge realistically the barriers that the translation of ethics into politics 
confronts led Spinoza to an unconscious slippage from a diagnosis of undesirable 
empirical realities to their onto-anthropological elevation to a human constant. In this 
way, what should fall into the category of sub specie durationis philosophical research 
becomes sub specie aeternitatis content and the break with Hobbesian ontology is not 
radical enough. The human as (even partially) given (to a degree, a product of 
animalistic, unruly appetites) comes to block from the (onto-anthropological) start the 
human as programme. An animal humanism, reminiscent of contemporary 
liberalism, is unwittingly re-inserted by the back door, re-sacralized (recall here the 
Christian undertones of the impossibility-of-goodness thesis) and elevated to an 
ontological obstacle to radical human re-invention. 
82 Postmodernism, despite its questioning of essentialism still allocates ontological space to unsocial 
human forces thus placing them sub specie aeternitatis.  See further, Papastephanou, ‘Onto-theology and the 
Incrimination of Ontology’. 
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GOODNESS AND EVERYDAYNESS  
Let us return now to the connection of worldlessness, ethics and divinity and examine 
how it charges everydayness with constitutive egology. We have already seen how this 
is stated in Murdoch's theory. She considers human beings as ‘largely mechanical 
creatures, the slaves of relentless strong selfish forces the nature of which we scarcely 
comprehend’. From there she concludes that ‘there are perhaps in the case of every 
human being insuperable psychological barriers to goodness’. She by no means sets 
for a cynicism of moral relativism or the impossibility of transcending ‘our ordinary 
dulled consciousness’.83 But her presupposing the latter is a fact that almost cancels 
out, in an ironic fashion, indeed, her own escape route either to an everyday, moral 
evaluation on grounds of values that resist the unification of God/Good or to an 
aesthetization and concomitant ethicization of the attentiveness to worldly, natural 
beauty (as we shall see in the next section). What is important here is that a selfishness 
that insuperably blocks goodness saturates the ordinary. The very same idea of the 
inability of goodness to appear in the worldly is encountered in Arendt, and that not 
only in her Human Condition but also in her On Revolution.84 To her, action is the faculty 
that ‘interrupts the inexorable automatic course of daily life’; ‘seen from the viewpoint 
of the automatic processes which seem to determine the course of the world’, action 
‘looks like a miracle’.85
This incrimination of a worldliness whose supposed automatism can be 
interrupted only via forces that are external to it enjoys a wider hegemony. Eagleton 
describes how French thought (from Sorrel and the Surrealists to Sartre, from Levinas 
to Lyotard, Derrida and Badiou) ‘returns incessantly to the break, crisis, disruption or 
epiphany of otherness that will tear you free of everyday inauthenticity’.
   
86 Here we could 
add Heidegger, whose influence on French thought is unquestionable. For Heidegger, 
the everyday world is fallen, as it is not attuned to the truth of Being, and authenticity 
is located in elements that contradict the ‘mundanity and habitualized repetitiveness 
of the everyday’.87
In any event, contemporary French theorists diverge on the mode of 
transcendence they favour. For instance, Badiou treats the ineffable as different from 
   
                                                     
83 Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, p. 90. 
84 Arendt, On Revolution, pp. 82-5. 
85 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 246. 
86 Eagleton, ‘Subjects and Truths’, p. 155, emphasis added. 
87 Gardiner, ‘Marxism and the Convergence of Utopia and the Everyday’, p. 27, fn  5.  
 MARIANNA PAPASTEPHANOU 112 
the order of the evental88 and criticizes vehemently Derrida and Levinas.89 However, 
what they all share and render, literally, of pivotal importance is the condemnation of 
the quotidian. R. Bernet's assertion that ‘Levinas does not cease repeating that the 
“Face” of the other is not a worldly phenomenon’90
Deriving from, or at least, presupposing, religious and Hobbesian undertones, 
such indictment of the everyday (and counterposition of it to the evental) is, arguably, 
uncommon to most Greek philosophy. I refer to some such examples only to show 
that, along with Marxism, there has historically been a theoretical trust in some 
redemptive qualities of the quotidian, without this trust entailing affirmation of the 
existent or blindness to the need for transcendence. The evental was within 
everydayness, an everydayness suffused with divinity, impregnated with dynamic 
unexpectedness and radically different from the modern conception of a calculable 
and controllable ordinary reality. Interestingly, the Greek world, and pre-Socratic 
philosophy in particular, seem to share this with Hinduism and Vedic philosophy.
 could also be said of the other 
thinkers discussed here, on the condition that the ‘Face’ is replaced with the 
transcendent notion that is appropriate in each case.  
91 
The evental, be it the lightning and thunder by which Zeus' presence was 
announced92
as for you kings, too, ponder this justice yourselves. For among human beings 
there are immortals nearby, who take notice of all those who grind one another 
down with crooked judgments and have no care for the gods´ retribution. 
Thrice ten thousand are Zeus´ immortal guardians of mortal human beings 
upon the bounteous earth, and they watch over judgments and cruel deeds, clad 
in invisibility, walking everywhere upon the earth.
 or the intervention in human affairs of divine messengers (angeloi such as 
Hermes or Iris) or the fly that set Socrates' reflective subjectivity on course, saturated 
everydayness. Hesiod [c. 8th century B.C.] turns to the rulers in his Works and Days and 
warns them of the existence of divine guardians of justice among human beings, thus 
connecting politics and ethics for the first time in Occidental thought:  
93
                                                     
88 Badiou, Saint-Paul: The Foundation of Universalism, p. 52ff. 
  
89 Badiou, Ethics: an essay on the understanding of evil, pp. 18ff. 
90 Bernet, ‘Christianity and Philosophy’, p. 326. 
91B. Sriraman, B. and W. Benesch, ‘Consciousness and Science: an Advaita-vedantic perspective on the 
Theology – Science Dialogue’ Theology and Science vol. 3, no 1, 2005, pp. 39-54, p. 40. 
92 F. Kittler, ‘Lightning and Series – Event and Thunder’ Theory, Culture and Society, vol. 23, nos 7/8, 2006, 
pp. 63-74, p. 64. 
93 Hesiod, Theogony, Works and Days, Testimonia, trans Glenn W. Most, Cambridge, MA, Harvard 
University Press, 2006, WD, verses 248-255. 
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Within the actual dystopian world, among human beings, there is a utopian world, a 
set the size of a city, a city of gods or ‘angels’ as a positively meant hetero-topia, clad 
in invisibility.  This epichthonian (earthly), divine justice within human everydayness is 
‘evental’, not in the sense of a transcendent disruption that is not of this world, as we 
know it today e.g. through the French line of continental thought, but in a sense that 
gives unity to action and its consequences in a more mundane manner than the 
modern religious counterpart or the philosophies of transcendence can do. And there 
was divinity and evental quality even in the repetitive and automatic character of 
daily and ordinary activities too. ‘There are gods here too’ (einai kai entaytha theous) was 
precisely the answer Heraclitus gave to his visitors,94 who expected to see signs of the 
supposed extraordinariness of a famous philosopher instead of the familiar and 
unassuming figure of an old man sitting by the fire. Now, whereas ancient 
everydayness itself, suffused with the divine, was constantly breaking any brittle 
automation and standardization, the modern conception of the quotidian and the 
evental irruptiveness of divinity are set in tension and mutual exclusion. This modern 
incrimination of the quotidian and the conjunction of unworldliness with the idea of 
God can be inferred, for instance, if we think through to its implications the following 
axiom of Michel Henry, the religious French thinker, as put by Bernet. ‘Nothing that 
is divine, that is, that participates in the divine Life, can appear and be recognized in 
the world’.95 Bernet draws a conclusion that is particularly helpful here: ‘egoism 
would therefore be a necessary consequence of atheism’;96
Even when the paradigm is not religious-philosophical, much (post)modern 
philosophy - with the exception of some Marxist lines of thought - incriminates the 
everyday as irreparably egological and automatic. We have seen in the beginning of 
this section how this operates regarding Murdoch's and Arendt's thought. Having 
established the connection with the general tendency in most contemporary French 
thought, let us now turn to Badiou who has taken distances from that thought on 
other crucial points.
 in religious thought, 
egoism is connected with worldliness as denial of the divine.  
97
                                                     
94 For a fuller account of the story, see, M. Heidegger, Brief űber den Humanismus, Frankfurt A.M., Vittorio 
Klostermann, 2000. Obviously my use of this story is different form the Heideggerian. 
 When it comes to the incrimination of the everyday we detect 
the same elitist transcendence. For Badiou ‘characterizes everyday life in quasi-
95 Bernet, ‘Christianity and Philosophy’, p. 327. 
96 Ibid, p. 330. 
97 Some of this difference is captured by Eagleton's following remark. ‘For Badiou, to be sure, ethics is 
not identical with the revelation of truth; it is rather the business of striving to remain loyal to it, and thus 
a practical form of life rather than a lonely epiphany’. In Eagleton, ‘Subjects and Truths’, p. 158.  
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biological terms as a realm of appetite, self-interest and dull compulsion’.98 What 
transcends it and renders a redemptive politics possible, in Badiou's view, is grace, a 
notion that rehabilitates revolutionary enthusiasm, animates thought by turning it 
active and tries, in other words, to breathe ‘God’ in human life. ‘“Grace” means that 
thought cannot wholly account for the brutal starting over on the path of life in the 
subject, which is to say, for the rediscovered conjunction between thinking and doing. 
Thought can be raised up from its powerlessness only through something that exceeds the 
order of thought. “Grace” names the event as condition for an active thought’.99 Thus, in 
Eagleton's words now, Badiou wishes ‘to insert the eternal into time’, to ‘negotiate the 
passage between truth event and everyday life, which is what we know as politics’. 
However, this passage ‘is blocked by the fact that Badiou, for all his undoubted 
political zeal, is as much caught in an elitist sort of antithesis between the ordinary 
and the epiphanic as Derrida’.100 For, Badiou does not share the Hegelian and 
Marxian view that ‘there are forces which are part of the situation but which also 
have the power to transform it. He does not trust the quotidian world sufficiently to 
believe that’.101
Against such mistrust we may argue that human beings are not just captive of the 
strict order of everydayness, the incriminated, nuance-lacking everydayness of Badiou 
and others that is disrupted by the monumental evental truth. The apparent 
recklessness of everyday dealings may hide a substratum of various ethical instances. 
But these remain hidden and bypassed when theory misses the translucence of such 
recklessness. When that happens, the gap between the incriminated quotidian and its 
transcendence appears unbridgeable. From Walter Benjamin down to Agnes Heller, 
there have been efforts to avoid precisely this gap.
  
102 Eagleton argues to a similar 
effect, I believe, when remarking that, if everydayness is as Badiou characterizes it, 
‘then indeed, little short of a quantum leap out of it into a higher dimension of truth is 
to suffice’.103 Let us explore this ‘quantum leap’ (or perhaps leap of faith?)104
                                                     
98 Ibid, p. 159. 
 in each of 
the cases that we have presented.   
99 Badiou, Saint-Paul: The Foundation of Universalism, pp. 84-5, emphasis added.  
100 Eagleton, ‘Subjects and Truths’, p. 158. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Gardiner, ‘Marxism and the Convergence of Utopia and the Everyday’. 
103 Eagleton, ‘Subjects and Truths’, p. 159. 
104 Consider, for instance, Wernick's question regarding Baudrillard's notion of the symbolic that resists 
thematization: ‘what would be a community that obviates communion, or that is a sharing of the 
finitude, sovereignty and ecstasy of those who comprise it, or that welcomes, without reducing, the 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 115 
LEAPS OF FAITH  
Murdoch argues for a transcendent good that can orient moral life. ‘In place of God 
as single, perfect, transcendent non-representable and necessarily real object of 
attention, [Murdoch] proposes the Good, which she has already pointed out is 
difficult to define and mysterious’.105 It is crucial here to explain that, for Murdoch, 
transcendence signifies ‘unselfing’ (as ‘the ability to overcome the primal fault of 
humanity, selfishness’) and ‘absolute goodness’ (as that which lies ‘outside phenomenal 
experience’).106 In search for such transcendence away from traditional metaphysics 
Murdoch resorts either to a rich code of moral conduct or to aesthetics. As some 
indication of the first strand has been given in a previous section, let us here turn to 
the second strand of Murdoch’s moral theorizing. Objects of beauty elicit a gaze, an 
attentiveness that undoes the self: ‘beauty, Murdoch claims, demands an 
“unselfing”’.107 But, as Asiedu's apposite counter-arguments prove,108 this kind of 
aesthetization of the secularized Good moves too quickly from the aesthetic to the 
moral. It is significant that Badiou's criticisms of Heidegger's ‘poetization’ of the 
prospects of secularization could very well apply to Murdoch's transcendence too.109
But, thought more deeply, the divergence of Badiou's and Murdoch's solutions to 
the problem of Good without God appears more radical than a mere disagreement on 
aestheticization. For, whilst Murdoch finds in the acceptance of human mortality the 
key to transcendence, Badiou assigns to philosophy the task of finishing up ‘with the 
motif of finitude’
  
110 and of embracing the image of the human as ‘something other 
than a mortal being’.111 To Murdoch, ‘Good is non-representable and indefinable. We 
are all mortal and equally at the mercy of necessity and chance. These are the true 
aspects in which all men are brothers’.112
                                                                                                                                           
Other? Along this path - shadowed by the deus communis, its horrors and its exorcism - lies the enquiry into 
the impossible, unworking or unavowable community conducted by Battaille, and more recently by 
Nancy and Blanchot’. In Wernick, ‘From Comte to Baudrillard’, p. 71. 
 Therefore, 
105 Asiedu, ‘Intimations of the Good’, p. 41. 
106 Ibid, p. 43. 
107 Ibid, 33. 
108 Ibid, p. 34. 
109 Badiou, Briefings on Existence, pp. 27-9. 
110 Ibid, p. 30. 
111 Badiou, Ethics: an essay on the understanding of evil, p. 12. 
112 Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, p. 74. Being equally at the mercy of necessity and chance due to all 
being mortal is not quite true. One would object to Murdoch here that her approach is oblivious to social 
and global inequality that determines the risks one faces, but that is beside the point here. 
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goodness is connected with the acceptance of real death and real chance and 
real transience and only against the background of this acceptance, which is 
psychologically so difficult, can we understand the full extent of what virtue is 
like. The acceptance of death is an acceptance of our own nothingness which is 
an automatic spur to our concern with what is not ourselves.113
This position can be thought as both parallel to and different from Badiou's idea 
of immortality, from which he urges us to begin in order to ‘think any aspect of 
Man’.
  
114 Murdoch´s view, as cited above, could very well be criticized in Badiouian 
terms, as one more case of the ‘renunciation of philosophical eternity, the cult of time, 
of Being-for-death and of finitude’, which are ‘obvious effects of historicism’.115
they are surely not rights of life against death, or rights of survival against 
misery. They are the rights of the Immortal, affirmed in their own right, or the 
rights of the Infinite, exercised over the contingency of suffering and death. The 
fact that in the end we all die, that only dust remains, in no way alters Man's 
identity as immortal at the instant in which he affirms himself as someone who 
runs counter to the temptation of wanting-to-be-an-animal to which 
circumstances may expose him.
 Thus, 
for Badiou, if ‘rights of man’ exist,  
116
For both thinkers, mortality understood in secular terms (note Murdoch's ‘our 
own nothingness’ and Badiou's ‘only dust remains’) is not a source of destructive 
meaninglessness. But, whereas for Murdoch mortality plays a more active role as an 
ethically enabling point of departure, Badiou's starting point is the metaphor of the 
Immortal. ‘An immortal: this is what the worst situations that can be inflicted upon 
Man show him to be, in so far as he distinguishes himself within the varied and 
rapacious flux of life’.
   
117 Outside grace, ‘humanity is an animal species. It is mortal 
and predatory’.118
                                                     
113 Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, p. 103. 
 What is significant is that both thinkers search for an ethically 
creative nihilism in a self-referential binarism of human life versus death, where 
selfishness is associated with the former and selflessness with the latter. Whether 
mortality or immortality, in both cases the reference point is the self in its relation to 
death. Bernet's question, which originated in a different context, is pertinent here 
then. ‘Are there only two forms of sensing: that which closes me off in an egoist 
114 Badiou, Ethics: an essay on the understanding of evil, p. 12. 
115 Badiou, Manifesto for Philosophy, p. 123. 
116 Badiou, Ethics: an essay on the understanding of evil, p. 12. 
117 Ibid, p. 12. 
118 Ibid, p. 11. 
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enjoyment and that which relates itself to an other who empties me of my blood and 
my life?’119 Equally pertinent is a question posed by P. Dews. ‘If the Good, as Badiou 
asserts (reminding us that Nietzsche, too, belongs in this lineage), is the 
“superhumanity of humanity”, then how on earth are we to get beyond ourselves, 
solely by our own effort, in order to attain it?’120 To answer them, Badiou has to resort 
to what Eagleton describes as ‘the numinous sphere of our fidelity to non-normative, 
exceptionalist truth events’.121
 Such exceptionalism pervades also Arendt's solution to the problem of goodness. 
In place of and in contrast to goodness, Arendt offers her conception of action.
  
122 She 
then grants it a miraculous quality,123 whose ‘potential to appear is rooted in the 
appearance of human beings in the world, in natality, which one can only witness and 
at which one can only marvel’.124 This is how Arendt herself puts it. ‘The life span of 
man running toward death would inevitably carry everything human to ruin and 
destruction if it were not for the faculty of interrupting it and beginning something 
new, a faculty which is inherent in action like an ever-present reminder that men, 
though they must die, are not born in order to die but in order to begin’.125 Here the 
emphasis is on life rather than on mortality but in such a way that birth becomes a 
secular substitute for bygone religious immortality, supposedly radically other to 
worldly, everyday normalcy. ‘The miracle that saves the world, the realm of human 
affairs, from its normal, “natural” ruin is ultimately the fact of natality, in which the 
faculty of action is ontologically rooted. It is, in other words, the birth of new men and 
the new beginning, the action they are capable of by virtue of being born’.126
                                                     
119 Bernet, ‘Christianity and Philosophy’, p. 332. 
 
Regarding the miraculous character of unexpected action that is supposed to break 
the chain of worldly ‘causality’, it can be shown to suffer from the same exceptionalist 
elitism of Badiou. Here is Gardiner on the parallel claims of Surrealism: ‘the 
Surrealists evoked the “marvellous” as an escape from or transcendence of everyday 
life. This prompted Lefebvre to argue that while the Surrealists understood that daily 
120 P. Dews, ‘States of Grace: The Excess of the Demand in Badiou´s Ethics of Truths’, in P. Hallward, 
(ed.), Think Again: Alain Badiou and the Future of Philosophy, London and N. York, Continuum, 2006, pp. 106-
119, p. 115.  
121 Eagleton, ‘Subjects and Truths’, p. 159, emphasis added. 
122 Bell, ‘On the Critique of Secular Ethics’, p. 16. 
123 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 246. 
124 Bell, ‘On the Critique of Secular Ethics’, p. 16. 
125 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 246, emphasis added. 
126 Ibid, p. 247. 
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life was routinized and degraded, they failed to realize that this was for distinct 
sociohistorical reasons. For Lefebvre, the notion of the “marvellous” therefore 
expressed a “transcendental contempt for the real”’.127 Again in Eagleton's parlance, 
‘whether all significant truths are of such a sublime, world-shaking kind is a point 
worth considering’.128
One may object to Arendt that that natality engulfs utopian energies (implicit in 
beginning again) in no way entails the radical difference of the new from the old that 
was outlived. The Arendtian conviction that action redeems the world
  
129 by 
interrupting the automatic quality of life is one more philosophical effort, like 
Murdoch and Badiou's, to escape the chains of an incriminated everydayness. The 
objection that any interruption of automation does not necessarily signify a true break 
but perhaps only a new automation, lest it is a divine interruption, holds for all three 
theories. The cluster of concepts such as ‘rupture, automation, intervention’ 
presupposes the metaphor of the divine in the following sense. According to Badiou, 
as Antonio Calcagno explains, the subject ruptures ‘the pre-political in order to give it 
a political sense through a decisive political intervention’.130 Thus, subjects ‘can 
investigate the pre-political in order to find out when the optimum time occurs so as 
to make an intervention’.131 Apart from having a reactive character132 and apart from 
reminding us the ‘waiting for God-ot’, this solution makes intervention appear not 
only timely but also divine. For, if everydayness is incriminated onto-
anthropologically, the forces that can disrupt it cannot but belong to the ‘other’ of 
everydayness. True, as we saw above, Badiou accommodates this ‘other’ post-
metaphysically in the division of the subjective path. However, we must recall here 
that Badiou133
                                                     
127 Gardiner, ‘Marxism and the Convergence of Utopia and the Everyday’, p.27, fn 5. 
 explains how all evental revolutionary enthusiasms were betrayed by 
their subjects through the fact that the latter did not display an ethical, ‘keep going’, 
128 Eagleton, ‘Subjects and Truths’, p. 158. 
129 Bell, ‘On the Critique of Secular Ethics’, p. 17. 
130 A. Calcagno, ‘Jacques Derrida and Alain Badiou: is there a relation between politics and time?’ 
Philosophy and Social Criticism vol. 30, no 7, 2004, pp. 799-815, p. 811. 
131 Ibid, p. 813. 
132 N. Hewlett, ‘Engagement and Transcendence: the militant philosophy of Alain Badiou’, Modern and 
Contemporary France, vol. 12, no 3, 2004, pp. 335-352. Hewlett explains that ‘Badiou insists that we should 
not wait for the event and that there are plenty of events in the past we can remain faithful to’. Apart 
from being itself a problematic assertion as to which past occurrence would qualify as an event, this does 
not undo, as Hewlett rightly notices (p. 347), the logic of Badiou's philosophy which ‘does indeed seem to 
be that we are playing a waiting, reactive game’. 
133 Badiou, Manifesto for Philosophy, pp. 120-135. 
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fidelity and they fell pray to the disastrous amalgam of ecstasy, the sacred and terror. 
They succumbed to the ‘dark desire of finishing off’134 what, on their view, should ‘not 
have the right to be’,135
Thereby it is no wonder that all three thinkers we have discussed here move 
agonizingly toward death and life as the limits of selfishness. In Murdoch's case this is 
ultimately effected as enrichment of moral conceptualization against the unity of 
primary concepts, as reconciliation with mortality and as aesthetic unselfing. In 
Badiou's case this is effected precisely the moment this mortality becomes connected 
with biologism and transcended by the immortality of the (wo)man as a ‘tissue of 
truths’.
 the opponent. This proves indirectly that the tension within 
the subject is between forces of equal measure (consider again Badiou´s question: ‘for 
how could the path of death not persist in dividing the subject?’). The symmetry of the 
alternative subjective paths that Badiou establishes speaks, in the end, for an 
‘impossibility yet necessity’ thesis. Even when the event irrupts and subjects are ready 
for a timely intervention, the ethic of fidelity to it is doomed from the start, because 
the subjects are called to overcome ontological (located within them) rather than 
merely ideological-contingent (sociohistorical) barriers. It seems that the strength of 
the quotidian is such that this ethic is just impossible for human beings. Badiou 
connects evental truth with an ethic lagging behind it and trying to keep pace with it - 
a futile task when the connected terms are of a different order; for a divine 
interruption requires a divine intervention and a divine perseverance unavailable to, 
or constantly annulled in, split human subjects.  
136
To sum up, in (post)modernity, searching for the Good without God entails a 
break with the old dogmatism of a single dominant conception of the good and paves 
the way for the dominance of various and competing conceptions of the good, 
comprehensive theories of the good life, a sacralized ‘marketplace’ of ideas about 
ethics. This cherished liberal development which is at first sight at odds with theism 
can be very well accommodated in northwestern contemporary thought in all its 
dominant varieties: thus, we may have Good(s) without God but also God without 
Good.
 In Arendt's case, this is effected through the recurrent reemergence of hope 
manifested in new life.                         
137
                                                     
134 Ibid, p. 133. 
 There is ethic(s) for all tastes: e.g. a liberalism of human rights, appreciative 
135 Ibid, p. 132. 
136 Badiou, Ethics: an essay on the understanding of evil, p. 12. 
137 See, for instance, Richard Swinburne's theory as discussed by Asiedu, ‘Intimations of the Good’. 
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or at least tolerant of a corresponding world power structure that prays to God138 
before unleashing a war. Also there is an ethics of radical otherness, reverent to a 
metaphor of God and relatively blind, patient or at least inoperative regarding 
concrete manifestations of global injustice. Or, there is an ethic of consistency and 
duration that operates within the death of God paradigm but is fraught with religious 
metaphors deriving either directly from the Bible139
THE TIME OF THE ANGELS  
 or from Lacan (e.g. most of 
Badiou´s ethical concepts). In the case of various ethical theories of a Lacanian origin, 
the imperative is: be truthful to desire and to an originary revelation; down with 
human rights and other theoretical bulwarks of the weak that actual political practice 
has usurped and constantly betrayed and anti-humanist psychologism has branded 
irreparably moralist. The impression that is given is of drastic choices everywhere and 
of a selection of one ethic(s) on offer, the most suitable to one's preference. In all those 
attempts at providing us with a version of goodness without God, God is neither alive 
nor dead: probably going along with Lacan on this, but meaning it somewhat 
differently from him, we may set for the view that ‘God is unconscious’. 
The metaphor of the angel has mostly been abandoned, unless a philosopher wishes 
to illustrate what human beings are not capable of and should concede all effort to 
it.140 We have seen above instances where Arendt and Murdoch employ the angelic as 
the totally other of humanity that sets the latter's outer limit. However, in her Time of 
the Angels, Murdoch makes a different use of angelism so as to illustrate the centripetal 
psychological forces (or, in Spinoza's words, the ‘unruly appetites of men’) that block, 
in her view, the path to goodness. Referring to God's death, she writes that ‘the old 
delusion ends, but there will be others of a different kind, angelic delusions which we 
cannot now imagine’.141 Carel, the main character of the novel, declares that there is 
no God and human life is senseless. He further states that ‘the precarious reign of 
morality, itself of course an illusion, is now at an end and that henceforth human kind 
is to be the victim of irresponsible psychological forces’. He visualizes them as 
angels142 of whom ‘we are the prey’.143 When uttering this, Carel144
                                                     
138 This point suffices to problematize Murdoch's position on prayer as a practice of unconditional merit. 
For more on this, see Asiedu, ‘Intimations of the Good’, p. 33. 
 is confronted by his 
139 E.g., Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 247. 
140 See, for instance, I. Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, Carbondale and Edwardsville, 
Southern Illinois University Press, 1978, p. 250. 
141 Murdoch, The Time of the Angels, p. 172, emphasis added. 
142 Ibid, p. 172 and 192-3. 
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carefully listening brother, Marcus, who felt ‘as if some ghastly threatening structure 
had been materializing in front of him’ and that he had to answer back. He does so by 
invoking and ethically rehabilitating everydayness. ‘But you are wrong, there are 
facts, real things, people love each other’, Marcus says.145 Consider, here, for a 
moment, Eagleton's reaction to Badiou's incrimination of the everyday: ‘are there 
really no contradictions in this quotidian realm? Is there no selflessness, compassion, 
extraordinary endurance?’146 And back to the novel now, where the primacy or, 
perhaps, exclusiveness, of selfishness is reasserted. Marcus receives the following 
response from Carel: ‘one can only love an angel. And that dreadful thing is not love. 
Those with whom the angels communicate are lost’.147 It should be mentioned that 
Murdoch does not share Carel's view about ethics after God's death148 and the 
absolute suffusion of humanity with cruelty. But because she does not share his 
brother's view either, she cannot but resort either to a socialized moral evaluation on 
grounds of a rich set of socially current values or to the lonely introspective unselfing 
of the aesthetic experience. Something equivalent can be said about the other thinkers 
we have discussed here, given their approach to the quotidian. Eagleton's remark, in 
his reading of Badiou, that, if one ‘had a less jaunticed view of the everyday, one 
might need a less exalted alternative’149
Angelology, which flourished in medieval times,
 holds for Arendt and Murdoch too. Such a 
possible alternative I shall only indicate here by using the metaphor and image of the 
angel differently. A closer consideration of it and the required disentangling of the 
important theoretical issues demarcating it go beyond the scope of this article.   
150 has increasingly been 
philosophy's embarrassment151
                                                                                                                                           
143 Ibid, p. 172. 
 and it has been confined to the history of ideas and 
scholasticism. That hindered a possibility for the angelic to become a productive 
metaphor for secularized philosophy, with the exception of its describing what is 
144 The character of Carel that Murdoch constructs in her novel personalizes, in a way, a figure that we 
encounter in Baudrillard's thinking as the ‘evil genie’ thereby registering another affinity of diverse 
contemporary theories. On Baudrillard's account of a diabolism, see Wernick, ‘From Comte to 
Baudrillard’, p. 69-70.  
145 Murdoch, The Time of the Angels, p. 172. 
146 Eagleton, ‘Subjects and Truths’, p. 159. 
147 Murdoch, The Time of the Angels, p. 172. 
148 On this point see Richard Holloway's afterword in Murdoch, The Time of the Angels, p. 241. 
149 Eagleton, ‘Subjects and Truths’, p. 159. 
150 M. L. Colish, ‘Early Scholastic Angelology’, Recerches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale vol. 62, 1995, pp. 
80-109. 
151 D. White OP, ‘Are Angels Just a Matter of Faith?’ New Blackfriars vol. 86, 2005, pp. 568-583.  
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impossible for humans, as I have already said, as well as rare cases of employment for 
more interesting and innovative purposes. The latter comprise uses as diverse as those 
by George Santayana's humanist discussion of Hermes as messenger,152 various 
analyses of the angelic in Rilke's Duino Elegies, Walter Benjamin's angel of progress 
inspired by Klee's Angelus Novus 153 and Michel Serres' angels of decentred 
circulation.154
In sharp contrast to the philosophical embarrassment for the word ‘angel’, there is 
the everyday use of it, in contexts varying from soap and mushy culture down to the 
genuine tenderness of the vocative, the way to address a loved one: ‘my angel!’. 
Outside philosophy, the picture regarding the metaphoricity of the angelic becomes 
even more complex if we consider the fact that many tens of millions (perhaps even 
hundreds of millions) of people today believe literally in the existence of angels, with 
many even believing in the (invisible) presence of angels in our midst.
 These uses, which cannot be discussed here for reasons of space, are 
exceptions to the rule of the philosophical neglect of angelism.  
155 We even 
come across the highjack of the angelic by New Age books, magazines and shows,156 
by anti-terrorist action aiming to establish volunteer networks of spies and connoting 
the associations of the surveillance and disciplining power of the term ‘Archangel’,157
                                                     
152 G. Santayana, Soliloquies in England and Later Soliloquies, Introduction by R. Ross, Ann Arbor, University 
of Michigan Press, 1967. 
 
and by the unfounded and politically dangerous New Age talk about Indigo and 
Crystal children sent to save the world. The latter cases justify Murdoch's remark 
about forthcoming ‘angelic delusions’ and the view that ‘we are the prey of the angels’ 
in a more literal sense than the one Murdoch bestowed on these phrases. It also 
provides a very apposite example of the pertinence of Badiou's critique of the position 
in which the Western subject has been put by ‘human rights and politics of difference’ 
discourse.  
153 Y. de Maeseneer, ‘Horror Angelorum: Terroristic Structures in the Eyes of Walter Benjamin, Hans 
Urs von Balthasar´s Rilke and Slavoj Žižek’, Modern Theology 19, 4, 2003, pp. 511-527.   
154 S. D. Brown, ‘The Angelology of Knowledge: Michel Serres’, The Sociological Review, 2000, pp. 147-153. 
155 I am indebted to the anonymous reviewer of C & H for pointing out the need for this interpolation.  
156 The angelic material of them includes stories of quasi-miraculous angelic interventions, ‘angel friends’ 
and rituals for summoning angelic assistance. In a curious way, this points to another sense of the times 
of the angels after God's death. For angels seem to be the handy compromise for many in need of 
replacing God with more popular and less-judgmental ‘solutions’ to metaphysical problems. See, White 
OP, ‘Are Angels Just a Matter of Faith?’, p. 572. 
157 As de Maeseneer explains, the slogan of that particular, New York based private security agency is: 
‘become a Crusader for the preservation of Western Culture and Values. Become an Arch Angel and 
Fight Terrorism’, de Maeseneer, ‘Horror Angelorum’, p. 511. 
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    This discourse, which Badiou astutely criticizes, places the Western self in the 
position of the distant voyeur, a position that can be better illustrated, I believe, by the 
metaphor of the angelic in yet another version, although Badiou himself refrains from 
drawing any such analogy. ‘Politics is subordinated to ethics, to the single perspective 
that really matters in this conception of things: the sympathetic and indignant 
judgement of the spectator of the circumstances’.158 Failing in its theogenic 
aspirations, the Western self goes for the second best, the angelic power of a detached 
viewer. This self is the voyeur who has not, supposedly, created the circumstances of 
the watched drama but is found in the morally privileged position of the intervening 
rescuer or the independent judge and referee. In front of ‘the good-Man, the white-
Man’, lies the ‘victim-Man’: ‘on the side of the victims, the haggard animal exposed on 
television screens’; this ‘ethics which rests on the misery of the world’ always ‘assigns the 
same roles to the same sides’.159
 Thus, we may depict the view of the pseudo-active, well-fed and well-protected of 
the world as an angelic view from above. But, from another perspective, beyond the 
scope of Badiou's philosophy, the angelic spectatorial passivity belongs to those 
chained in place, to those unable to reach that height, to fly upwards and have an 
overview. In Samuel Beckett's play,
 The spying apparatus that employs the archangelic 
metaphor we saw above is only an extreme instantiation of this world division into the 
looking down ‘angels’ and the observed ‘recipients’ of their possible benevolence or 
‘just’ retribution.  
160
                                                     
158 Badiou, Ethics: an essay on the understanding of evil, p. 9. 
 while waiting for Godot, the tramps fail to 
theorize the master-slave narrative enacted in front of them. They only receive it 
voyeuristically as something that adds variety to their lives, makes their lives look less 
deprived and miserable (compared to the worst, as experienced by even more 
unfortunate others) and renders awaiting less tedious. They lack the theoretical 
distance, the transcendence that is implicit in radically questioning ideological 
hegemony; but they have the angelic detachment of the inactive, the non-intervening 
but mellow charitable reaction of the sympathetic viewer. During the prolonged 
waiting for the divine timely interruption, the tramps themselves try out this master-
slave game. It helps them pass their time while waiting, but it also precludes the 
exploration of other possibilities of shaping their lives, irrespective of the promise of 
Godot. The social construction of the master-slave relation and its historically 
contingent grounding in antagonism and selfishness remain unnoticed, as the relation 
159 Badiou, Ethics: an essay on the understanding of evil, p. 13, emphasis added. 
160 S. Beckett, Waiting for Godot, London, Faber and Faber, 1988. 
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is projected to the ahistorical sphere of the ontological split of subjectivity. Thus, they 
are left to alternate in the position of the prey and the angels. 
 God animates ancient, modern and postmodern thought, either as image of the 
Other of existing ‘standardized’ humanity in more ‘evental-structured’ pagan human 
pasts or as the image of perfect goodness or omnipotence in monotheism or as a 
figurative speech for immortality in forms of atheism. Both, when present as well as 
when absent in a theory, God has so far been thought's breath and shadow. For even 
God’s death leaves a specter behind, haunting philosophy.161 Either as an image of 
power and autonomy to be imitated or as a simulacrum of human inability of true 
goodness, the metaphor of God still demarcates human potentialities. The 
(post)modernist megalomania (even in its despondent moments) of the man(sic)-
becoming-God metaphor can be countered with the audacity of the metaphor of the 
angel as much in its parodic, uninhibited, even acrimonious, quality as in its enabling 
and thought-enlarging ethical significance. Contra becoming God, people should try to 
become angels. In throwing such dice,162 philosophy can bring into play an ‘additional 
signifier’.163
Philosophy has, nevertheless, purported to have, since many decades now, 
overcome the dogmatic model of the thinking subject as a self-appointed prophet. 
Now, what is of greater importance for philosophy of subjectivity is also to escape the 
absolutism of the figure of the true saint. For it rejected the idea of the philosopher as 
self-appointed prophet only to replace it with the idea of the disappointed saint. The 
latter is saintly enough in order to perceive the absolute nature of ethics contra facile 
rationalist notions of it but also adequately disillusioned and reconciled with his/her 
own and humanity's constant failure to realize it. Thus, s/he confines his/her role to 
communicating (or, rather, failing to communicate) impossibilities and deplores or 
celebrates in an oracular way the unpresentability and unattainability of true ethics. 
Perhaps it is time for philosophy to focus on the enabling and reconstructive side of 
order and articulation beyond the postmodernist gestural emphasis on the ineffable, 
the wholesale incrimination of representation and the unattainable height of 
 Perhaps that is the challenge confronting a world-wide philosophy that, in 
its post-metaphysical pretensions, it employs and recruits prophets, apostles, martyrs, 
saints, but never angels - as it treats them as humanity's only radical others.   
                                                     
161 Here we may usurp and adapt Derrida's notion of hauntology. For a brief account of this Derridean 
term, see Calcagno, ‘Jacques Derrida and Alain Badiou’, p. 808. 
162 Badiou, Manifesto for Philosophy, p. 138. 
163 Ibid, p. 36. 
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saintliness. Divine speech may be unavailable to humanity,164 but there is always the 
Pauline option of the ‘tongue of the angels’ accompanied with love.165 Far from being 
self-appointed prophets and at variance with the model of postmodern absolutist 
saintliness burdened with an undecipherable and superhuman message, critically 
thinking subjects could be described as angels. Outside metaphysics, the metaphor of 
the angel that I am employing here must be understood chiefly in the Greek sense of 
the word, denoting the messenger.166 Critical subjects as messengers do not impart a 
divine will,167
For the terrain of human drama is the quotidian. ‘The content that is tested by a 
moral principle is generated not by the philosopher but by real life. The conflicts of 
action that come to be morally judged and consensually resolved grow out of 
everyday life. Reason as a tester of maxims (Kant)’ finds these conflicts. It does not 
create them.
 perhaps not even a will that is entirely their own: they harken to the 
coarse truth of things and try to shape it into an early warning or an ethically 
permissible intervention. Whether issuing a warning against an unjust war, an illiberal 
new order, environmental damage and perhaps less tangible pathologies or voicing 
the agony of an examined life, the messengers' means should be the seduction of the 
persuasion by proof rather than the persuasion by seduction. They should bring to the 
fore an unnoticed segment of quotidian reality, breaking the news to unsuspecting 
hearers. 
168 Instead of waiting for the event to break out, we must learn to notice it 
and receive it, to prepare it and be it. In Italo Calvino´s view, the stake we face is to 
‘seek and learn to recognize who and what, in the midst of the inferno, are not 
inferno, then make them endure, give them space’.169
                                                     
164 D. H. Fernald, ‘A Good Man Speaking Wisely: morality, rhetoric, and universalism’, Dialogue and 
Universalism, vol. 3, no 4, 2004, pp.  209-215, p. 209. 
   
165 Cf. Badiou, Saint-Paul: The Foundation of Universalism, p. 91. 
166 This sense is the common denominator of both pagan and monotheist notions of the angelic as it is 
present in various cultures and religions e.g. Hinduism, Islam etc. See, White OP, ‘Are Angels Just a 
Matter of Faith?’, pp. 568, 574 and 578). It is of particular interest, but surely beyond the scope of this 
essay, to examine the angelic message in Greek tragedy from the philosophical point of view of the 
enabling metaphor. 
167 Even in traditional religious angelology, angels were often granted an existence and will that was 
independent from God. See, Colish, ‘Early Scholastic Angelology’. 
168 Norris, The Truth About Postmodernism, p. 77. Norris takes this passage from Habermas but uses it for a 
purpose that is different from mine here. 
169 I. Calvino, Invisible Cities, London, Vintage, 1997, p. 165. 
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That humanity can search its best in a non-metaphysical ethical exploration of the 
metaphor of the angelic is justified by the fact that the metaphor of the angel is 
ethically multi-faceted. It has even a Manichean division of angels of darkness (the 
indifferent or self-congratulating voyeurs we saw above with their own hierarchy up to 
the archangelic punishing, or protective of Western interests, hand) and angels of 
light. Would theirs be a struggle, however, regarding whether the light could defeat 
darkness? This would fall into the paradox that Arendt describes,170 of the good 
becoming bad in the effort to spread goodness. The answer is the other way round. 
The indifferent, voyeurist ‘tourists’ of the world that we tend to be, facing no haunto-
anthropological paltry excuse for our condition, should seek and learn to discern and 
decode the message of quotidian complexity. For there is nothing inherently 
compelling about the lack of light: only too much viewing from afar, too unreflective 
tele-vision viewing. But, then, what would a world of true angels be? Many 
philosophers would have a ready answer: a world of utter boredom, for it would lack 
drama! Drama lived or drama watched, and from the protected seat of the academic 
for that matter? But in answering as above, philosophy would be trapped once again 
into the voyeurist-angelic, detached ‘enjoyment’ of the world. That would be precisely 
an ‘angelic’ answer: one fascinated by, and praising, eternal tele-vision. For, after all, 
drama comes from the Greek word ‘dran’ which means to act. Boredom (otium) is an 
element of eternal passivity not of eternal activity, if eternity is understood as ‘an 
attribute of the category of Truth’ as operation.171
The standard delimitation of human potentialities that is fraught with religious 
and Hobbesian undertones can be revisited through the angelic because the latter in 
its ancient or non-Western as well as in its religious and modern sense of the 
messenger illustrates the reconciliation of transcendence and immanence, a hovering 
between heaven and earth. Neither human nor divine,
 To act like an angel is an eternal 
task, the task of an (im)mortal with ethics. 
172 the angel's interstitial 
existence moves between a God's eye view and looking at human eye level. In 
polytheist contexts, as a messenger, the ancient angelos (divine or human) is a vector of 
a break with reality that is born by reality itself,173
                                                     
170 Arendt, On Revolution, p. 83. 
 by its inexorable course which 
171 Badiou, Manifesto for Philosophy, p. 130. 
172 For some thinkers of early scholasticism, unlike the deity, ‘angels live in time and are mutable, capable 
of learning what they did not know already and of experiencing joy and sorrow’. See, Colish, ‘Early 
Scholastic Angelology’, p. 84 and p. 92.   
173 We must not forget that the transcendence of deity in antiquity is neither one of being outside earth-
bound existence nor one of being emotively and ethically wholly other to humanity.  
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comprises not just automation but constant reshuffling. After the delivered message, 
the self is called to live with the new knowledge and act upon it as a critical, reflective 
subject. Even if a critical redirection does not occur, e.g. when the message falls on 
deaf ears, still, little remains the same for its recipient, who starts facing the 
consequences, as the example of environmental damage of today may glaringly prove.  
Beyond the trauma of a reconciliation with mortality and the renewed promise 
inherent in recurrent life, as well as beyond the heroic immortality of 
uncompromising commitment, there lies the perfectibility that is enabled by undoing 
the metaphysical insuperable barriers to goodness that are raised by the incrimination 
of self-love and everydayness. According to some medieval angelologists, angels share 
with human beings a kind of ‘self-love that is not sinful’. They describe it as a natural 
moral aptitude and inclination that ‘includes the desire to live, the desire to know 
oneself, and the desire for self-preservation’.174 Between selfishness and self-denial 
there is ample space for conceiving an ethically authorized love of the self and the 
other. Likewise, a view from above need not be a God’s eye view, as one of 
unfathomable distance from everydayness, as a pure outside: the only permissible 
position for looking down is the position of imagination. Above the everyday you hear 
its noise, all the languages, all the tragic dilemmas, losses and mourning of humanity. 
And you hear the heroic and saintly within the quotidian, the joy of the memorable 
moment, the hope and effort despite failures. You hear more clearly what others 
expect from you, you have a clearer view of your involvement in their lives. Like 
Walter Benjamin's angel, but not as desperately and hopelessly, this angelic figure 
tries to ‘interrupt the (dis)course of history by bearing witness to its victims’. Instead of 
intervening ‘in order to deliver a discontinuous moment, to introduce a shock’175
But the position of imagination, to be ethically truly enabling, should be held 
momentarily. The perspective of the observer must be followed by the one of the 
participant. In Wim Wender's film Der Himmel über Berlin (the title literally translated as 
‘the sky over Berlin’ but the film was released in English as The Wings of Desire) what is 
common to humans and angels is desire, not the desire of a Nietzschean will to power 
but a desire to live among others, like others, and timely intervene in human affairs. 
 or to 
assert one´s power and enhance one´s moral self-image, it opens one´s eyes to the 
ruined of history by making their voice heard. Instead of being too immaterial to 
make a difference and instead of being destructive enough to produce a disruption 
which borders with terror, the angelic imaginative overview articulates a message in a 
self-critical tongue of love for the other as much as for the self.  
                                                     
174 Colish, ‘Early Scholastic Angelology’, p. 101. 
175 de Maeseneer, ‘Horror Angelorum’, p. 513. 
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In the sequel of Der Himmel über Berlin, in Faraway, so Close (original title In Weiter Ferne, 
so Nah), the angel intervenes to save a person and becomes human. Such an 
intervention makes humanity - unlike the intervention that interrupts the voyeurist 
angelic overview of a self-righteous western moralism and that it curiously happens to 
be always profitable and self-congratulatory. Against the timeless downward gaze, the 
challenge is, ultimately, to look at eye level176
 
 rather than down from above. Away 
from the megalomaniac association of perfection with divine omnipotence, this 
metaphor of the angelic bestows upon the human being its lost transcendence. Away 
from a haunto-anthropological indiscriminating incrimination of self-love and the 
quotidian, it restores the human subject in the realm of perfectibility, breathing power 
and possibility in humanity. Perhaps wandering at sea level, plunging into the depths 
of everydayness is the only vindication of the mistaken Platonic etymology of the 
human being, anthropos, as ano throsko, to look up.  
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